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Invisible Mutuality between Structural Inertia 
and Learning Disability
— A Case Study of the West Japan Railway Accident 4.25 —
Shigeo ATSUJI＊1  Nguyen Ngoc Thang＊2  Kazunori UEDA＊3
Abstract
 This article examines a case study of the JR (Japan Railways) West accident, which was 
the worst railway accident in Japanese history. The purpose of this research is to prevent 
similar accidents by focusing on organizational ‘learning disabilities’ (Garvin, 2000). We 
review fi rstly a summary of the JR accident. Secondly we review the irrational behaviour of 
the driver involved, which originated in the system of re-education of the JR West 
Company known as ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’. Thirdly, we examine the interference with organiza-
tional learning bounded by ‘structural inertia’, and fi nally, we review the ‘organizational 
disaster’ in relation to the ‘learning disability’. This research is concerned with compliance 
and corporate governance.
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I. JR West Accident 4.25: Accident or Disaster?
 Since the advent of railway-based society, tragic railway accidents have occurred in all time 
periods and countries, despite great progress being achieved every year in mechanical technology. 
For instance, 23 people died in Canada which accident occurred in 1986, 56 people died in France 
(1988), 101 people died in Germany in (1998), and more recently, 71 people lost their lives in 
China (2008), all due to railway accidents. Figure 1 shows accidents that have incurred many 
fatalities since 1980. Although the countries mentioned enjoy comparatively advanced technology, 
these accidents claimed many lives.
 JR is the common name of the Japan Railways, the largest railway conglomerate in Japan, which 
has a history dating back to the privatisation of the Japanese National Railway (JNR) in 1987. On 
25 April 2005, a derailment accident occurred on the Fukuchiyama Line of the Japan Railway West 
Company. In this accident, 106 passengers and the driver died, and 562 others were injured. The 
accident was investigated by the Aircraft and Railway Accident Investigation Commission (ARAIC), 
whose fi ndings were released as the “Fukuchiyama Line Derailment Accident Investigation Report” 
(hereafter, ARAIC’s Report) in June 2007. Figure 2 shows the derailment situation of the railcars 
during the accident site.
 Just before the crash, the train overran its intended position at the previous station by approxi-
mately 72 meters. Because of an adjustment back to correct the location at the station, the train 
departed from Itami with a delay of 90 seconds. It passed through Tsukaguchi, which is the station 
following Itami on the route to Osaka, with a delay of 60 seconds. The train travelled at 116 km/h 
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Figure 1 Railway accidents with many fatalities since 1980
(source: Nikkei Telecom 21).
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Figure 2 Derailment situation of train
(source: ARAIC’s Report 2007)
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on this section to make up for the time lost due to the overrun, and it then derailed on the curve 
between Tsukaguchi station and Amagasaki station on the JR Fukuchiyama Line. The excessive 
speed caused the two front cars to crash into an apartment building after derailment. The upper 
speed limit at the site was 70 km/h on a curve of 300-meter radius. In addition, the JR West had a 
congested railway schedule due to competition with other private railway companies. These 
situations are the cause of the driver’s speeding.
II. ‘Administrative Limitation’ of ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ as Organizational Disaster
 The driver had not performed driving operations for 40 seconds just prior to the accident but had 
monitored the radio exchange between the conductor and the dispatcher and had made a note of it. 
The background to the driver’s actions was described in the ARAIC’s Report as follows: “There was 
concern about the ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ system, which is the JR West’s re-educational system, and the 
punitive measures that were experienced in the past”. Figure 3 shows the dialogue between the 
driver, conductor and control dispatcher immediately before the accident took place (following 
Figure 8: α).
 In this accident, while in actuality the train overran by approximately 72 meters at Itami-Station, 
the driver asked the conductor to submit a false report. The conductor accepted the request from the 
driver: “Please shorten the distance of the overrun” and reported an “8-meter overrun and 90-second 
delay” to the control dispatcher of train service management. The control dispatcher made contact 
with the driver for confi rmation. The driver was in a dangerous situation because the reported 
8-meter overrun is inconsistent with a delay of 90-second, as became clear from the train service 
recorder immediately after the train crashed. The ARAIC’s report noted that the driver’s dangerous 
driving was caused by fear of ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’, which he had experienced in his past. Figure 4 
shows the handwritten memo which the driver was taking until the accident took place. The driver 
took the memo while operating the train for his ‘self-defense’ for 40 seconds he was not driving.
 ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ is the re-educational system carried out for the purpose of preventing accidents 
and incidents, but a part of this system consists of punitive measures. This function is performed 
from 9:00 to 17:45 in the ‘offi ce work room’ of each train division. This room is a space for offi ce 
workers and administrators, and those who receive ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ sit in the position labelled 
‘driver’ in Figure 5. These personnel are required to work all day on a report under the supervision 
of an administrator or offi ce personnel. Members who have received ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ say “My 
ewposure to the other members made me feel uncomfortable.”
 ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ mainly consists of report writing, and it also includes a test that measures the 
driver’s basic knowledge. However, the educator in charge determines the actual work content in 
Invisible Mutuality between Structural Inertia and Learning Disability  5
le from Itami
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9:18:54
“Make a false report, please”
“You overrun very much.”
“This is dispatcher, over.”
“This is conductor, over.”
“Report please.”
“8m overrunning, 90sec delay.“
“How many minutes is the
delay? Report again.”
“90sec. over.”
“Driver reply.”
“Driver, please reply.”
Approaching to curve 116km/h
Driver
9:18:10
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Released the accelerator and coasng
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Figure 3 Dialogue of the JR West accident 4.25
(source: ARAIC, 2006, pp.4‒16, pp.34‒37).
Figure 4 Driver’s original memo (Japanese evidence)
(source: ARAIC, 2006).
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‘Nikkin Kyoiku’, and questionable chores of a ‘punitive’ character are also included, such as 
longhand ‘copying of work rules’ and ‘weeding of train tracks or fl ower beds’, as reported after this 
accident. In addition, anyone who undergoes ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ may have his salary reduced.
 Such a punitive education method is an example of the type of education method that former 
Japanese companies and the Japanese armed forces often adopted. One problem associated with this 
educational method is that it depends excessively on personal spiritual strength and concentration 
without investigating the cause of the failure.
 Table 1 shows the number of suicides that have occurred at the JR West Company. From 2000 
to 2005, 18 employees committed suicide, and on average, four people take their own lives each 
year. There are six railway companies in the JR Group each operating in a separate region: JR 
Hokkaido, JR East, JR Central, JR West, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu. No data exist regarding the 
number of employees overall who have killed themselves, and only JR West has been brought to the 
public attention. Although it cannot be concluded that the direct cause of these suicides is ‘Nikkin 
Kyoiku’, there is the possibility that problems exist under JR West’s management (following Figure 
8: γ).
 The driver involved in the accident described above had experienced ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ three 
times, for a total of 18 days. In addition, the driver occasionally complained to his friend that “I 
must write text all day long and need permission even to go to the toilet”, as described in the 
ARAIC’s Report. Following the accident, on June 1, 2005, a questionnaire was distributed to 3,096 
drivers by the West Japan Railway Union, and 2,676 responded. Over 25% of the respondents 
Figure 5 The situation of ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ in the JR West
(source: Suzuki et al., 2007, p.67).
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answered that JR employees felt dissatisfaction. As stated above, ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ was the personnel 
management system. The purpose and result of this educational method diverged, and in general, the 
managers of JR West did not engage in ‘double-loop’ learning (Argyris, et al. (1978)).
III. Organizational Learning Bounded by the ‘Structural Inertia’
 In this accident, the driver did not operate normally and tried to protect himself from ‘Nikkin 
Kyoiku’, that is, the ‘un-learning’ processes of the JR West organization.
 Firstly, the driver requested the conductor to make a false report. And the driver took the memo 
in an act of self-protection against undergoing ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ in spite of the actual driving 
operation. With the driver’s behaviour, his learning was a personal form of learning for his own 
self-protection, that is, it was ‘un-learning’; which means he could learn but refused to do so. 
Secondly, the conductor did not use the emergency brake, and worse, he did not know how to use 
it. In this case, learning did not materialise, that is, the situation involved ‘non-learning’. Thirdly, 
the dispatcher made contact with the driver for fact-checking despite the existence of an ongoing 
dangerous situation. The behaviour of the dispatcher followed the manual. However, this action was 
a mistake resulting from a lack of circumstantial judgment, that is, ‘mis-learning’. Finally, manage-
ment’s misunderstanding of the effect of ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ is also involved because they ignored the 
feedback from company personnel and put profi ts above safety in their management policy. This 
decision-making process caused negative effects in learning, that is, irrational learning, or 
‘ir-learning’.
 ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’, as stated above, is a re-education system used for personnel management and 
is designed to prevent accidents caused by ‘human error’. However, this system led to ‘human 
Table 1 The suicides of JR West’s crews (from 2000 to March, 2005)
the date of suicide situation the date of suicide situation
21 Mar, 2000 hanging 21 Apr, 2003 jumping in front of JR train
Summer, 2000 hanging 24 Apr, 2003 jumping from JR building
24 Oct, 2000 jumping in front of train 23 Jun, 2003 hanging
10 Jan, 2001 hanging 20 Jul, 2003 jumping in front of JR train
12 Jan, 2001 entering the water 1 Sep, 2003 jumping in front of JR train
8 Feb, 2001 jumping in front of train 23 Sep, 2003 hanging
24 Apr, 2001 jumping in front of train 31 Jan, 2004 hanging
6 Sep, 2001 hanging Oct, 2004 jumping in front of train
14 Oct, 2001 hanging 13 Mar, 2005 suffocation by carbon monoxide poisoning
(source: Suzuki, et al., 2007, p. 164).
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error’. JR West managed employees using the psychological pressure provided by ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ 
and by attaching importance to manual labour without feedback. Ultimately, multiple ‘learning 
disability’ occurred at unit organization levels. The cause of these learning disabilities is the lack of 
communication between members of the organization, which forbade questions regarding organiza-
tional policy and objectives and concealed facts. These fl awed traditions and customs led to 
‘organizational inertia’. That is, the organizational climate and culture reduced the mental horizons 
of its members, who were unable to think of anything except their own self-protection.
 According to Reason (1997), ‘security holes’ – weaknesses and gaps in safety – always exist 
somewhere even if precautionary safety measures are taken. However, the taking of redundant 
precautions can be expected to solve this problem. Unfortunately, accidents can still occur because 
the holes in safety measures can occur in any location or even move and spread. While further 
improvements in technology may occur, the problem of railway accidents cannot be solved on a 
technological basis alone but must also be addressed from an organizational perspective that includes 
decision-making, personnel education and policy-making.
 Several years after the accident, it became clear that JR West had required that the accident 
report be concealed from the investigating offi cials. JR West intervened actively in three facets – as 
‘representatives’ of the public, within the investigating body itself, and among the supervisory 
authorities. As an example, JR West approached a speaker at a public meeting, arranged beforehand 
to tell the same story to the police, and then demanded a change in a report about ‘a delay in the 
deployment of the ATS’ from the investigators.
ATS: Automatic Train Stop
According to the ARAIC’s Report, the cause of the accident was “human error”, i.e., the 
accident was attributed to a delay in braking. In addition, these reports presumed that this 
accident could have been avoided by the Automatic Train Stop (ATS) device. The ATS is a 
Figure 6 Four-layer model of ‘learning disabilities’ in the JR West accident
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form of safety equipment designed to stop or decelerate trains to ensure safe operation. There 
are several types of ATS devices, and JR West has used a newer type (ATS-P) in place of the 
old type (ATS-SW) partly since 1990. In fact, the old type of ATS was incapable of stopping 
trains that are over speed. On 25 April 2005, ground ATS equipment was not installed in this 
railroad area - not even the old type of ATS. As the curvilinear speed was excessive, the 
accident was labelled as ‘human error.’ Moreover, this case involves ‘double standards’ 
regarding installation of the ATS device, as both the SW and P types were used by the supervi-
sory authorities as the result of governmental policy. The government authorised use of the old 
type of ATS only for JR, whereas the major private railroad companies were required to install 
the newer type of ATS.
IV. Lost Compliance and Governance following Organizational Systems-error
 A human-relation factor is involved in the problems with the ATS: namely, managerial decisions. 
There was a large difference in safety measures between JR West and JR East, within the same 
industry. JR East allocated a budget of 25 billion yen to safety measures, but JR West allocated only 
3.5 billion yen. On the other hand, JR West greatly reduced its defi cit after having switched from 
being a public enterprise to a private enterprise. It is thought that the managers of JR West might 
lack social responsibility in the decision-making process regarding the distribution of managerial 
resources. This is an organizational cause of the accident, the JR accident originating, as stated 
above not only from technological factors caused by lack of ATS equipment, due to delays in instal-
Investigators
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Figure 7 Negative agent model of JR West.
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lation, but also from psychological factors present in the organizational personnel system then even 
extended to bribery. These are behaviors that are completely contradicted their apologies to victims. 
As Figure 7 illustrates, JR West has engaged in illegal behaviour with the ‘lost compliance’.
 According to Berle et al. (1932), governance is established based on the propriety of managerial 
power. Governance functions only if the managerial power rests on the premises of social propriety 
and neutrality. However, the illegal acts of JR West lie far from a sense of social ethics. The 
propriety that Berle insists on cannot be confi rmed. A series of organizational injustices carried out 
by JR West represents negative governance based on the wrongful use of power.
 Figure 8 shows the complicated factors in the JR accident. A summary of this accident indicates 
problems at three levels. Firstly, as stated before employees had learning disabilities at each level, 
representing the human errors that caused this accident. In this aspect, JR West’s management could 
be described as ‘ghost corporate governance’. Secondly, the problems with ATS and ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ 
were the results of ‘lost business ethics’. Human errors should be accounted for by the system, but 
in this case, the system itself embodied errors. Finally, some organizational factors existed. For 
instance: privatisation and ‘a thousand dismissals’. In fact, the main problems underlying this 
accident are the culture and climate that were in place during the long history of the organization. 
This aspect can be termed ‘forgettable social responsibility’.
 There are many factors at work in the historical background of the JR West accident on 4.25. 
For instance the administration of JNR was responsible for the reconstruction of the organization 
Figure 8 Invisible mutuality of the JR accident 4.25
(source: Atsuji Seminar (2007)).
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that predated JNR – the so-called ‘Kokutetsu’. The Kokutetsu was protected by the Japanese 
government and this organization had an entrenched ‘structural inertia’. Furthermore JNR’s organiza-
tional members are ‘yes men lucky’, that is, employees who profi t anytime they agree with 
management decisions. On the other hand, the negative aspect was the learning disability of their 
organizational change. When reforming JNR, these agents had to undertake “a thousand dismissals”. 
This meant the laying-off of a thousand employees of JNR with the decision making being 
Top-down. At the present time, the matter is pending in court. Many problems in the historical 
background have gradually begun to surface. Therefore, there are the problems with allocation of 
HRM (Human Recourse Management). That is the ‘invisible factor’ on the historical aspects.
V. Disaster Formula applying Organizational Accident of the JR West
 In light of the current JR accident, we believe that we should establish the degree of danger 
involved in organizational accidents. Specifi cally, we suggest a formula for an organizational 
accident based on empirical data from the JR accident.
Formula for an Organizational Accident
ε = α×β×γ / (ρ+τ)
 α: excessive speed  β: ATS problems  γ: Nikkin Kyoiku  ρ: JR’s management  τ: railway policy
 The ‘Formula for an Organizational Accident’ relies on fi ve variables, for which empirical data 
are readily available: the human factor (in the case of JR, the driver’s speeding and system of 
contact (α)), the physical factor (the ‘double standards’ of ATS (β)), the unexpected factor (the 
overrun or delay and fear of ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’ (γ)) and an estimation of the systemic fatigue in orga-
nizational management and the lack of clarity concerning railway policy (ρ + τ). This formula 
includes not only visible factors such as human error but also invisible factors, such as safety 
management and railway policy.
 The trial of the ex-president of JR West was completed on January 11, 2012, and the judgment 
was “not guilty”. He reconstructed the crash site and shortened the curve from 600m curve to 304m 
curve in 1996. He was also the person responsible for ATS equipment at that time. Additionally, in 
court, there were displays of organizational un-social behaviour by JR West. These behaviours were 
intended to protect the corporation and themselves, resulting in organizational inertia. It is essential 
that ‘compliance’ and ‘corporate governance’ are rejected by such organizational inertia.
 Figure 9 shows the new administration method which we want to suggest. If the organization 
causes some problems or scandal, it is necessary to regulate it in an external environment. For 
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instance, the supervisory authorities can freeze the capital and assets of the company by force when 
the organization practises ghosting corporate governance, and can stop the exchange of securities 
when there is a loss of business ethics. Furthermore, stakeholders can audit the market for forget-
table social responsibility. In such ways, in order to regulate an organization that has negative 
inertia, it is essential to give the supervisory authorities the executive faculty which regulates organi-
zation by force.
 The longer the history of an organization, the more strongly organizational inertia can develop, 
and this inertia cannot be changed easily. When similar accidents occur, individuals can evade 
individual responsibility because these accidents are not caused by individuals but are the result of 
organizational behaviour. We attach great importance to the creation of new laws that can judge 
organizational behaviour. However, that is the role of government. JR West should reconsider the 
relationships of various stakeholders based on their social responsibility with compliance and 
governance as a public service organization by making use of a review of the failures involved and 
they should undertake a radical rebuilding of the decision-making process of the organization.
Conclusion
 Railway accidents cannot be solved only from a technological viewpoint, but also must be 
addressed from an organizational perspective, using the case study of the JR West accident as the 
worst ‘organizational disaster’. The purpose of this article is prevention of similar accidents, by 
focusing on organizational learning disability. We review fi rstly, a summary of the JR accident, 
Ghost Corporate
Governance
Forgettable Social
Responsibility
The Lost
Business Ethics
Freezing
Capital & Asset
Stopping
Exchange Securities
Auditing
Market by Stakeholder
Negligent Organization
Figure 9 The new administration method for negligent organization from three aspects
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secondly, the irrationality of organizational behavior, originating in the re-educational system of JR 
West ‘Nikkin Kyoiku’, thirdly, the interference with learning disability of members by the organiza-
tional structural inertia, and fi nally, we discuss the possibility of improved compliance and corporate 
governance.
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